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We develop a model for the analysis of macroeconomic management that are 
caused by failures in the private banking system. Our analysis is applied to Tanzania, a 
country that faces significant difficulties from a banking system that holds large 
quantities of non-performing assets. 
We have constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model that is solved 
numerically. As initial examples, we have first simulated the model, using historical 
exogenous parameters, and have compared endogenous macro outputs with 
corresponding historical outcomes. Assuming all exogenous parameters remain constant 
for eight years of the simulation, the banking system begins to become insolvent by the 
final year. 
We then impose a program that attempts to increase the productivity, and hence 
solvency, of the private sector by increasing government expenditures on infrastructure, 
which are, in turn, financed by foreign capital flows. This experiment leads to a small 
improvement in real income, but does nothing to enhance the solvency of the banking 
system. Finally, we impose an improvement in the efficiency of public utilities. This 
change appears to offer an avenue for improving the solvency of the banking system, the 
goal of our study. 
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In this paper we develop a model for the analysis of macroeconomic management 
that is caused by failures in the private banking system, a difficulty that confronts a 
number of developing countries.
1 Our analysis will be applied to Tanzania, a country that 
faces significant difficulties from a banking system holding large quantities of non-
performing assets. 
Tanzania, after years of maintaining a highly protected economy, is now in the 
process economic restructuring. Former state owned enterprises are being privatized, 
fiscal and financial reforms are being instituted and the economy is moving towards a 
more liberal trade regime. The essential aim of these reforms is to make the domestic 
economy more efficient. We will show that such increased efficiency may well have the 
important additional benefit of improving the solvency of the banking system. In 
particular, we show that improving efficiency of state enterprises has a greater effect on 
bank solvency than does for example, the increased provision of foreign lending. 
The paper develops a dynamic model that can generate endogenous bank failures, 
and allows for alternative fiscal and monetary policies. Among these policies are the 
provisions of discount loans from the central bank to compensate for non-performing 
assets, and the use of fiscal instruments to reduce interest rate pressures on debtors. We 
also permit alternative exchange rate regimes, and allow the type of devaluation policies 
that are typical of developing countries confronting financial crisis. 
                                                 
1 Blejer, Feldman, and Feltenstein (2000) develop a model of insolvencies generated by bank panics, and 
motivate this model by considering certain recent experiences in Latin America.   3
In the next section we provide a brief overview of the type of model we will 
develop, emphasizing applications to developing countries. Section III discusses some of 
the relevant issues in Tanzania. Section IV will develop the theoretical structure of our 
model. Section V describes the data sources for the parameterization of the model along 
with numerical policy simulations. The final section has a discussion of the simulation 
results and concluding remarks. 
II.  Computational Models for Developing Countries and the Tanzanian Context 
  Computational general equilibrium models are widely used for the evaluation of 
government policies. Among the many different types of models that have been employed 
by a variety of researchers, two general types stand out. The first of these employs large 
scale, highly detailed static structures representing the production and consumption 
technologies of a particular economy. The second formulation incorporates smaller scale 
models with less sectoral detail and is the approach adopted here. These latter models have 
intertemporal structures which permit the evaluation of a wide variety of macroeconomic 
policies effecting growth, inflation and investment, while still being able to examine the 
sectoral implications of these policies. Additionally, this approach (in common with the first 
one), permits the study of the impact of policies on differing consumer groups. 
  Of the large-scale models applied to developing countries, the interested reader may 
see among others, Adelman and Robinson (1988), Benjamin and Devarajan (1985), 
Narayana, Parikh, and Srinivasan (1991), Shoven and Whalley (1984), and Taylor (1990). 
Dixon (1984), although not specifically applied to developing countries offers also a useful 
paradigm for many of these models.   4
  The model we develop for Tanzania is of the second type with a considerable 
amount of sectoral detail. Its key feature will be the incorporation of financial instruments to 
evaluate banking issues. Feltenstein (1992) constructs a simple two period model that 
incorporates financial assets. The model is used to analyze the Dutch disease phenomenon 
in Mexico. A similar model with financial assets is used in Feltenstein and Shah (1993) to 
study investment tax credits in Pakistan. Here, following this strand of the literature, we 
develop a multi-period model with substantial financial content at the expense of exhaustive 
sectoral detail for Tanzania. In particular, we have a domestic banking sector that may 
realize unanticipated difficulties in its asset portfolio. The model allows us to endogenously 
evaluate outcomes of alternative government policies along with their impact on the banking 
sector. 
III.  Issues and Application to Tanzania
2 
a.   Background: For the past decade Tanzania has been implementing a reform 
program intended to dismantle the system of controls that pervaded the country's economy 
since independence. Despite considerable liberalization, the country still faces a variety of 
problems. There are severe problems in the budgetary management of the public sector. As 
a consequence, Tanzania faces persistently large trade deficits, and finances domestic 
investment largely from foreign capital inflows.  
  The other chronic problem is the failure of the banking system, financially weak and 
highly concentrated, to adequately evaluate the credit-worthiness of borrowers. Large 
portions of the assets of the banking system are currently non-performing, and there has 
been a resulting need for government infusion of new capital into the banks. Budgetary 
                                                 
2 Much of this section is derived from Tanzania:  The Challenge of Reforms: Growth, Incomes and Welfare.   5
expenditures are skewed in favor of current, rather than capital expenditure, leading to the 
inadequacy of productive infrastructure. Private savings have been meager, in the face of 
low or negative real interest rates. Since public revenues are very limited, the ability to 
finance development from anything other than foreign funds has been inadequate. 
b. Banking Issues: Tanzania has experienced significant banking sector problems 
since 1988. The financial system is concentrated and banks have little competition. Till 
the early 1990s a single bank held more than 75% of the assets of the entire system, while 
foreign banks were allowed in the country only in 1992. The state-owned commercial 
banks, accounting for over 95% of the system, are effectively insolvent. At the end of 
1993, 60 to 80 percent of all bank loans were non-performing and the losses of the largest 
bank were equivalent to 70% of its deposits. In 1994, the government contributed to 
recapitalizing this bank, as well as to the reorganization of the country’s second largest 
bank. There was a run on a small state bank in 1994, leading to its eventual failure in 
1995. The Tanzanian subsidiary of Meridian BIAO also failed in 1995. 
  We thus see that the government of Tanzania faces major problems with insolvent 
banks. While a variety of remedial policies have been suggested we consider two such 
policies here. The first of these will be the use of foreign capital inflows to finance new 
investment and debt service.
3 The second will be the imposition of greater efficiency in 
the operation of state enterprises that are currently the major source of non-performing 
loans. We will not explain how such efficiency improvements might arise. The policy 
changes will be instituted after first generating a simulated bank failure. The resulting 
                                                 
3 We do not attempt to explain how such financing will be obtained. Rather, we assume that it will come 
from exogenously determined inter-governmental bank flows.   6
outcomes will allow us to compare the results of alternative regimes. Let us now turn to 
the model we will use to address these issues. 
IV. Model  Structure 
In this section we will develop the analytical structure of our model much of 
which is designed to permit a numerical implementation. The model has n discrete time 
periods. All agents optimize in each period over a 2 period time horizon. That is, in 
period t they optimize given prices for periods t and t+1 and expectations of prices for the 
future after period t. When period t+1 arrives, agents re-optimize for period t+1 and t+2, 
based on new information about period t+1. For example, there may have been a 
technology shock or certain banks may have become insolvent. We will now describe the 
specific structure we employ in carrying out our numerical simulations. 
1. Production 
We consider 8 factors of production and 3 types of financial assets. In particular 
we allow for 5 types of capital (corresponding to the five aggregate non-agricultural 
productive sectors
4, land, and rural and urban labor as the factors of production. The 
financial assets are domestic currency, bank deposits and foreign currency. Each of these 
factors and financial assets is replicated in each period and, accordingly, has a price in 
each period. Period 1 domestic currency is the numeraire. 
  An input-output matrix,  , is used to determine intermediate and final production 
in period t. Corresponding to each sector in the input-output matrix, sector specific value 
added is produced using capital and urban labor for the non-agricultural sectors, and land 
At
                                                 
4 The choice of 5 types of capital is essentially arbitrary, as we could have more or less capital types. 
   7
and rural labor in agriculture.
5 In our numerical examples, we use a 27 sector matrix, 
which, in fact, represents Uganda. We have chosen to use this matrix, from an other 
country, in the absence of an up to date matrix for Tanzania. Our implicit assumption is 
thus that the two countries have similar technologies, an assumption that is, of course, 
open to question. The model is calibrated later to lend credibility to this assumption. These 
sectors were chosen so as to correspond to available surveys of demand data, and keeping 
the specific purpose of the model in mind. 
  We allocate the different factors across the 26 sectors (imports being the last sector) 
on the basis of their production requirements.
6 These 26 sectors were further divided into six 
categories all of which have subsectors similar to each other. For example, category 3 
contains textiles, building materials and chemicals, while the factor inputs are urban labor 
and type 2 capital. The five different types of capital are perfectly mobile across subsectors 
in a given category, but are immobile across categories. As we shall see, labor, on the other 
hand, may migrate from the rural to the urban sector. 
The specific formulation of the firm's problem is as follows. Let  ,   be the 
inputs of capital and urban labor to the jth non-agricultural sector in period i. Let Y  be 
the outstanding stock of government infrastructure in period i. The production of value 







j ,Y Gi)  where we assume 
that public infrastructure augments productivity of private production. 
                                                 
5 The use of neo-classical value added functions "sitting above" an input-output matrix is common. The 
reader may wish to see Shoven and Whalley (1984) for papers that use this approach. An application and 
detailed description of functional forms is given in Feltenstein (1986). 
 
6 Details of the different sectors and allocation of inputs to them is available from the authors on request.   8
Sector j pays income taxes on inputs of capital and labor and agriculture is taxed on 
its use of labor.
7 Hence the effective price of inputs also depends on the tax rates. Thus 
the prices charged by enterprises,P i, are given by 
                                                              (1) 
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where va(P,YGi) is the vector of cost-minimizing value-added per unit of output and t is 
the tax rate. 
We suppose that each type of sectoral capital is produced via a sector-specific 
investment technology that uses inputs of capital and labor to produce new capital. 
Investment is carried out by the private sector and is entirely financed by domestic 
borrowing.
8 The investor may receive an investment tax credit (denoted by ki) well as a 
depreciation allowance (denoted by di) in period i. In period i he also pays a capital, or 
profit tax (denoted by tKi), on the returns to his investment. Note that these three variables 
are expressed in percentage terms. Also, pKi is the return to capital in period i. 
Let CHi be the minimum cost of producing the quantity of capital,Hi in period i. 
Then future debt obligations must equal the return on new capital. Hence: 
                                 
i
i K i K










) 1 ( ) 1 ( C                           (2) 
where r i is the interest rate in period i, given by r i = 1/PBi and P Bi is the price of a bond 
in period i. Accordingly, the investor takes out a loan form the banking system to cover 
this costs. This loan then becomes an asset of the banking system. 
                                                 
7 The interpretation of these taxes is thus as a profit tax and a personal income tax that is withheld at the 
source. 
 
8 We assume that all foreign borrowing for investment is carried out by the government, so that, implicitly, 
the government is borrowing for the private investor but the debt thereby incurred is publicly guaranteed.   9
We make one further assumption about investment and the individual firm. If 
investment, as a percentage of the existing sectoral capital stock, falls below some pre-
determined minimum percentage, then the sector is unable to pay its new debt obligations 
that were incurred to finance this investment. Accordingly, the bank that holds these 
assets now holds corresponding bad debts.
9 This situation might occur if the interest rate 
rose sufficiently so as to reduce the sector’s investment. The assumption reflects the 
notion that each firm, or sector, has a lower bound for its operations, reflected by its level 
of investment, below which it cannot operate.  
2. Banking 
  The banking sector in our model is simple but is meant to capture some of the key 
features and problems of the current system in Tanzania.  We assume that there is one bank 
for each non-agricultural sector of the economy and it lends predominantly to the sector with 
which it is associated. The banks are, however, not fully specialized in the sector to which 
they correspond. We will make the simplifying assumption that each bank holds 50 percent 
of the outstanding debt of its particular sector and 12.5 percent of the debt of each of the 
remaining four sectors. Hence bank 3, for example, holds 50 percent of the debt of sector 3, 
and 12.5 percent of sectors 1, 2, 4, and 5.  Similarly, it makes 50 percent of its loans to 
sector 3 and 12.5 percent of the loans to the other four sectors each.
10 We make this 
assumption of diversification of assets in order to avoid a possible situation in which the 
insolvency of a particular sector leads to the automatic insolvency of its related bank. We 
                                                 
9 We thus claim that a bankrupt firm does not invest, while a solvent firm does. The fall of capital 
formation below some predetermined rate may be used as a proxy for bankruptcy. 
 
10 Clearly these percentages are arbitrary and have been used only for illustrative purposes. We could have any 
initial pattern of distribution of bank assets across the different sectors.   10
could, of course, have a single bank that lends to the entire economy, or, indeed, any other 
banking structure. 
  We next impose a solvency requirement on the banking system. Namely, if 8 
percent of a bank's assets are in default, caused by a corresponding insolvency among its 
borrowers, then the bank is declared insolvent and the government seizes all its assets.
11 The 
depositors in this bank find their assets frozen and the bank ceases to lend. The bank's 
supply of loans, and hence its assets, is determined by the demand for loans from the 
productive sectors of the economy. Of course its supply of loans is restricted by the existing 
capital. The demand for loans is, in turn, determined by the investment equations described 
in the previous section. The banks' deposits, and hence liabilities, are determined by the 
consumers' savings behavior, determined from the intertemporal optimization which we will 
now develop. 
3. Consumption 
There are two types of consumers, representing rural and urban labor. We suppose 
that the two consumer classes have demands for the different types of goods that are 
given by constant fractions of their incomes. These fractions, derived from Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions, are normally different across consumers. The consumers also differ in 
their initial allocations of scarce resources and financial assets. 
The consumers maximize intertemporal utility functions, which have as arguments 
the levels of consumption and leisure in each of the two periods. As in Feltenstein (1992), 
we permit rural-urban migration, which depends on the relative rural and urban wage 
                                                 
11 This figure of 8% is simply taken to correspond to standard bank regulations. The average ratio of capital to 
total assets in the banking system is approximately 8%. Hence an 8% loss of assets would be tantamount to a 
total liquidation of capital. Of course other numbers could be used for the purpose of simulations.   11
rate.
12 The consumers maximize these utility functions subject to intertemporal budget 
constraints. The consumer saves by holding money, domestic bank deposits, and foreign 
currency. He requires money for transactions purposes, but his demand for money is 
sensitive to changes in the inflation rate. In addition, the consumer’s demand for bank 
deposits is sensitive to his perception of the solvency of the banking system. In particular, 
as banks increasingly incur bad loans, the consumer’s interest elasticity of money 
declines, causing him to reduce his bank deposits.
13 
4. The  Government 
In our model the government collects income, profit, and value added taxes, as 
well as import duties. It pays for the production of public goods and subsidies. In 
addition, the government must cover both domestic and foreign interest obligations on 
public debt. The government finances its budget deficit by a combination of 
monetization, domestic borrowing, and foreign borrowing. We assume that foreign 
borrowing in period i is exogenously determined by the lender. The government then 
determines the face value of its bond sales in period i, and finances the remainder of the 
budget deficit by monetization. 
5.  The Foreign Sector and Exchange Rate Determination 
The foreign sector is represented by a simple export equation in which aggregate 
demand for exports is determined by domestic and foreign price indices, as well as 
domestic real income. The change in the dollar value of exports in period i can then be 
                                                 
12 This approach is motivated by the Harris and Todaro (1970) model of rural-urban migration, in which 
movement to the city depends upon relative urban/rural wage rates, as well as the probability of finding 
work in the city. Feltenstein (1992) estimates such a migration model for Mexico. 
 
13 This reflects the notion that the consumer worries about the safety of his own deposits as he sees the 
banks become progressively more insolvent.   12
written as a function of the change in the relative price ratio and change in domestic real 
income where each of the two components is weighted by their respective elasticities. 
The combination of the export equation and domestic supply responses then determines 
aggregate exports. Demand for imports is endogenous and is derived from the domestic 
consumers’ maximization problems. Foreign lending has not been modeled, but has been 
taken to be exogenous. Thus gross capital inflows are exogenous, but the overall change 
in reserves is endogenous. 
The government also attempts to adjust the exchange rate. The supply of foreign 
reserves available to the government in period i is modeled as a function of private 
capital flows and exogenous foreign borrowing by the home government. The 
government’s demand for assets is assumed to be determined by an exchange rate rule. 
The government selects a critical level of foreign reserves in period i that is set 
exogenously, and in our simulations is arbitrarily taken to be the value of three months of 
imports. It adjusts the exchange rate if the stock of reserves differs from its chosen target. 
When reserves exceed the government’s target, the government leaves the exchange rate 
as is, or appreciates it only slightly, and when reserves are below the target, it devalues 
the exchange rate substantially. 
Finally, changes in the money supply in period i, ∆MSi, are now given by: 
) 1 ( 1 − − − + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ i FG i FGi i i Mi Si y e y e OMO y M     (3) 
where ∆  is determined by the government’s financing its budget deficit, and ∆ yMi OMOi 
represents money created via open market operations. The remainder of the right hand 
side represents the domestic currency value of the balance of payments where ei is the   13
exchange rate and yFGi is the supply of foreign exchange reserves available to the 
government in period i, respectively. 
V.  Applications to Tanzania 
In order to simulate our model we have used a variety of data sources and 
parameter estimates. We first describe these sources and then discuss the parameter 
estimates. This is followed by the policy simulations. 
1. Data  Sources 
Production: The input-output structure of intermediate and final production is 
derived from the Input/Output Table for Uganda, 1992. The government is assumed to 
have a Cobb-Douglas production function whose coefficients are those of the aggregate 
economy.
14 In the absence of direct estimation of investment functions, we have taken the 
functions to be the same for each type of capital.
15 The coefficients of these functions are 
taken to be those of the value added function for the construction industry. 
Taxes: Tax rates are derived in the following ways. The effective indirect tax rate 
is calculated as the ratio of total indirect taxes to consumption for 1995-96. These figures 
are taken from International Monetary Fund’s Recent Economic Developments for 
Tanzania (RED, 1996). Direct taxes enter the model as taxes levied upon capital and 
labor as inputs to production. Effective rates are calculated as the ratios of the total 
capital and personal income tax revenues to the corresponding incomes. As with indirect 
taxes, the direct tax rates are assumed equal across sectors. We derive the shares of 
                                                 
14 Clearly a more precise government production function should be estimated as a subject of future 
research. 
 
15 Even thought the function are the same, the levels of investment may differ across capital types as 
investment depends on the interest rate and the rate of return to capital, which may differ across capital 
types.   14
capital and labor in GDP from the Uganda input-output matrix. These shares are then 
applied to the Tanzania GDP to give corresponding incomes. Labor and capital taxes are 
then taken as the corresponding direct taxes from the RED (1996), Table 12. 
Consumption: There are two domestic consumer categories, urban and rural, in 
our current model version. We take consumption weights on each of the 27 input-output 
goods as the expenditure shares in the input-output matrix. There is a single foreign 
consumer, representing the rest of the world. This consumer’s demand weights are given 
by the export expenditure shares. 
Initial Stocks: Finally, for our simulations, all initial allocations of factors and 
financial assets are taken to be stocks at the end of 1993. These are largely derived from 
the RED (1996). Stocks of urban and rural labor are taken by applying the shares of 
income going to urban and rural labor, derived from the Uganda input-output matrix, to 
1993 Tanzania GDP, taken from Table 3. Money stocks are taken as M2 (Table 16), 
while initial holdings of interest bearing assets are taken as total government domestic 
debt (Table 14). Foreign assets, which are the initial dollar expenditures on Tanzanian 
exports by the rest of the world, are derived from Table 21, as export plus service 
receipts. The stock of land is taken to be the real value added to agriculture and is taken 
from the Uganda input-output matrix as the gross operating surplus of the agricultural 
sector (columns 1-4). Finally, capital stocks are determined as the gross operating 
surpluses of the corresponding 5 aggregate sectors in the Uganda input-output matrix. 
2.  Estimation of Behavioral Equations 
This section deals with the estimation techniques and data sources used to 
characterize the relevant behavioral parameters for the Tanzanian economy using models   15
that have been known to work for other developing countries. Lack of adequate time 
series data constrains us to estimating simple econometric models. 
Money Demand: The demand for money is estimated using a formulation 
suggested by Khan (1980). Using a (semi) log-linear model based on portfolio allocation 
theory that allows for adaptive expectations in inflation and partial adjustment in money 
demand, the demand for money of the representative consumer is given by 
           (4) 
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t π   is the rate of inflation at time t. This equation was estimated using 
annual data for the years 1966-1994 taken from the International Financial Statistics. 
Since the equation is non-linear in parameters, a search was carried out for the values of b 
in the range   with the objective of maximizing the log-likelihood function of the 
estimated equation. The value of b was allowed to vary in increments of 0.01, and it was 
found that b=0.85 maximized the log-likelihood function. The estimated equation 
corresponding to this value of b was found to be 
1 0 ≤ ≤ b
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   (-3.965)  (4.499)     (-5.915)    (15.407)  
DW=2.218   adj. R
2 = 0.934    
where the numbers in the parenthesis are the t-statistics and the starred variables 
represent the variables shown in equation (4). All the terms in the estimated equation are 
significant at the 5% level and have the correct signs. The magnitudes of the estimated   16
coefficients are broadly consistent with those reported for a group of developing 
countries in Khan (1980).  
Export Supply:  Tanzania is primarily an exporter of agricultural products with 
coffee being the single largest commodity. The export supply equation estimated here is 
based on Goldstein and Khan (1979). The supply of exports is assumed to be a log-linear 
function of relative prices and an index of the productive capacity of the country. 
t t t
S
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where   is an index of the volume of exports, PX is an index of the unit value of 
exports, P is an index of consumer prices, and Y is the log of real GDP. Since agriculture 
forms the major share of GDP it is reasonable to use GDP as a proxy for the index of 
domestic capacity. The data for this was obtained from Country Economic Memorandum 
on Tanzania prepared by the World Bank and from the IFS tables. The equation was 
estimated for the years 1981-1994 using simple OLS where the numbers in the 
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                 (0.422)           (0.041)                  (2.735) 
DW=0.944                  adj. R
2 = 0.489 
Note that the price term in this regression is not significant and the adjusted R
2  
does not explain a lot of the variability in the data. However, the F-test for overall 
significance is satisfied at the 5% level and the Durbin-Watson statistic is in the 
permissible range. One possible reason for the price ratio being insignificant is that the 
export of cash drops does not depend on relative prices but on the production in the 
current year. This also explains why the GDP coefficient is significant. At this stage we   17
are not able to estimate an import equation that exhibits any systematic pattern due to 
insufficient data. 
3.  A Base-Case Simulation 
In order to use our model for counter-factual simulations, it is first necessary to 
see how well it replicates historical outcomes. Accordingly, we have incorporated the 
various estimated parameters described above and have then run the macroeconomic 
model for the years 1994 to 2001, taking 1993 as the base year. We also suppose that the 
Central Bank wishes to maintain a level of reserves equal to three months of the level of 
imports in 1993. However, the Central Bank does not maintain a pure float to achieve this 
goal. Rather, if the level of reserves falls below its target level, then the slope of the 
Central Bank’s devaluation is set equal to –2.0. If the level of reserves rises above the 
target level, then the Bank revalues with a slope of –0.5. Clearly these numbers are also 
arbitrary, but they offer an example of a possible policy exercise. Table 1 reports the 
simulation outcomes of macroeconomic variables, with actual historical values in 
parenthesis. 
It may be worth making a few remarks concerning the simulated and actual 
values. First, notice that our model generates rates of growth in real GDP that are slightly 
lower than historical values for the years for which comparisons have been made. Exports 
track actual data reasonably accurately. We under estimate imports for two reasons. First, 
the use of the Uganda input-output matrix reflects the lower use of imports in Uganda. 
Second, the semi-floating exchange rate that we use tends towards a trade balance 
equilibrium. Government expenditures and tax revenues are in line with historical reality. 
The continuous increase in government expenditures over the eight years of the   18
simulation is caused by the rise in the domestic interest rate, as well as the depreciation of 
the exchange rate. Both of these changes cause the government’s debt service, both 
domestic and foreign, to rise. Inflation is in somewhat lower than the actual rate, as we 
attribute all foreign lending to deficit financing. Finally, the simulated exchange rate 
generates a real depreciation, rather than the real appreciation that actually was realized. 
We see that the real interest rate remains slightly positive, and there are no bank defaults. 
We thus conclude that our model, with the exception of imports, generates a reasonably 
accurate approximation of Tanzanian reality. 
5. Policy  Changes 
Let us now turn to counterfactual policy simulations. These simulations have been 
chosen on account of their relevance to the Tanzanian economy and have been designed 
to analyze the relationship between the financial sector and the current reforms. Hence, 
we first provide a brief overview of the recent happenings in the Tanzanian economy and 
then present the results of two simulations. 
a. Background: In 1993, Tanzania established the Parastatal Sector Reform 
Commission (PSRC) to coordinate and implement the privatizations of parastatals. 
Almost 60% of the about 400 parastatal enterprises earmarked at the beginning of the 
privatization process had been divested by mid-1998. Of these about 50% of the entities 
were divested through share or asset sales and 31% were liquidated. Although data by 
enterprise are not available, according to the PSRC, the financial performance of these 
enterprises seems to have improved following privatization (RED, 1999). This has also 
been accompanied by a burst of activity in the private sector. Of the 1537 new businesses   19
registered between September 1990 and June 2000, 47% were started by domestic 
investors, 21% by foreign investors and 32% as joint ventures.  
In 1991, following the Nyirabu Commission’s report the government of Tanzania 
initiated a financial sector reform program.
16 By June 1998, the financial sector 
comprised of 17 (operating) commercial banks, 9 nonbank financial institutions, 105 
foreign exchange bureaus, and a number of informal intermediaries. Inspite of the 
changes, the financial sector is still dominated by commercial banks and quite 
concentrated as in our model. Of the 17 commercial banks, three – the National bank of 
Commerce (NBC), the National Microfinance Bank (NMB) and the People’s Bank of 
Zanzibar (PBZ) remain under government control and together control 40% of domestic 
credit and 55% of deposits. The six largest banks together still hold 90% of all assets. The 
next major steps in the reform process involve privatization of the government owned 
banks and public utilities. In fact, the government has made considerable progress with 
the preparations for the privatization of the utilities (see RED, 1999). 
b. Simulation I (Fiscal Policy change): Suppose now that the government carries 
out a simple fiscal policy change. Namely, it increases the target for capital expenditure 
of the government, as a percent of GDP, by 3 percentage points. The aim of such an 
increase in public infrastructure (compared to the base case) will be to improve the 
productivity of the private sector, thereby reducing bankruptcies. At the same time, 
however, we will suppose that two thirds of this increase is financed by foreign capital 
inflows, in the form of government grants. This simulation will thus reflect the type of 
                                                 
16 Since Section III already provides an overview of the banking sector, here we review only the current 
happenings in the financial sector as a background for our simulations.   20
ratio of foreign to domestic financing currently being proposed by the donor countries. 
Table 2 gives the result of this experiment. 
  We observe a number of changes, as compared to Table 1. There is a small, but 
significant, increase in real GDP, amounting to about one percentage point in all periods. 
The price level rises somewhat, as the price effect of an increased budget deficit is 
partially mitigated by private capital’s increased productivity. There are small increases 
in final sectoral capital stocks in two of the five sectors, and, an increase in the real 
interest rate caused by the budget deficit increase, tends to reduce private investment, 
despite the foreign capital inflows. As a result there is no improvement in the solvency of 
the banking system and banks 2 and 5 still fail. We thus conclude that the increase in 
expenditure on public infrastructure, financed by foreign capital, does nothing to relieve 
the pressure on the banking system. 
c. Simulation II (Efficiency Improvement in Utilities): Suppose then the 
government tries another policy to improve the productivity of the private sector, thereby 
increasing their ability to repay their debts. Namely, let us suppose that there is an 
improvement in the efficiency of public utilities. We do not attempt to explain how such 
an improvement might be brought about. Rather, we will assume that Sector 13 – 
electricity and water, and Sector 20 – communications (of the input output matrix), 
require 20 percent less real value added per unit of output than in the original input output 
matrix.
17 Otherwise, all parameters remain the same as in the benchmark simulation. 
Thus, this simulation supposes that the same infrastructure can be provided to the private 
                                                 
17 These three utilities have been chosen since their privatization has very high priority on the government’s 
reform agenda (RED, 1999).   21
sector as before, but the costs in terms of required inputs, are reduced. The results are 
given in Table 3.  
We see that real GDP rises by approximately 1.3 percent by the final year, as 
compared to Table 2, in response to the efficiency improvement. As might be expected, 
the budget deficit declines in the absence of the increased infrastructure spending, 
combined with the increased efficiency of public infrastructure. The general increase in 
GDP has increased the rates of capital formation, so that final capital stocks are equal or 
greater to their levels of Table 2 in four of the 5 sectors. As a result, only sector 2 is now 
below the threshold for being able to repay its debts, and, accordingly, no bank now falls 
below the 8 percent capital asset ratio for insolvency. 
  We see that measurable improvements in the real economy can be achieved by 
increasing the efficiency of public utilities. Perhaps more importantly, it appears to offer 
an avenue for improving the solvency of the banking system, the goal of our study. We 
conclude that increased public spending on infrastructure, even when partially financed 
by foreign funds, does little for the banking system. Increased efficiency of public 
enterprise does have an impact on bank solvency, however. 
V.  Discussion and Conclusion 
We have constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model and applied it to 
Tanzania. The model contains a disaggregated banking sector that can incur non-
performing assets. Besides being the first model that explores the interaction between the 
banking sector and the macro-economy for Tanzania, we believe it mirrors the current 
Tanzanian reality quite well. The Tanzanian government intends to privatize all parastatal 
enterprises and the state owned banks. Our CGE framework automatically treats all firms   22
and banks as private entities, thereby allowing us to analyze the implications of such a 
process. The findings therefore are of considerable policy significance. 
Our model suggests that increased public spending on infrastructure will not 
improve the solvency of a concentrated banking sector even though it is decentralized 
and follows prudential regulations. Further, it also suggests that foreign aid is not a 
panacea for Tanzania. How the aid is utilized is just as important as the simple provision 
of aid for a sound macro-economy. Aid, tied or otherwise, that results in increased 
government spending on infrastructure, given the current banking sector in Tanzania, will 
lead to insolvencies further down the road. 
Our simulations also suggest that an improvement in the efficiency of public 
utilities does not have negative consequences on the concentrated banking industry. This 
implies that, in the process of privatizing these companies, the government must ensure 
that the change leads to more efficient enterprises. Indeed, the evidence in Tanzania from 
the other privatized parastatals indicates efficiency improvements in the post privatization 
phase (RED, 1999). This augers well for the economy, compared to the base case 
simulation.  Nonetheless, it seems that the privatization process needs to implemented 
rapidly in order to relieve pressure on the banking sector, thereby enhancing efficiency. 
One final lesson seems to be that government policies need to take into account the 
concentrated nature of the banking industry while determining the set of feasible policies 
that are available to the public sector in countries like Tanzania. 
Our model can be used to address a variety of issues, from budgetary policies to 
changes in lending behavior. It highlights the consequences of a concentrated private 
banking industry, suggesting that this area requires further research. This is of particular   23
importance for many developing countries, where the banking sector is often 
concentrated and does not necessarily follow prudent regulations as in our counterfactual 
simulations. We therefore believe that such a model will be a useful tool for policy 
makers.   24
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Table 1. Base Case: 1994-2001 
 
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 




129.2  147.7  174.8 206.5 257.1 305.7 




106.8  105.9  112.2 111.0 117.8 115.6 


















26.4 29.0 30.0  33.7  32.0  36.0 











137.0  167.2  190.7 243.4 289.2 371.2 
Interest rate 3/  7.4  16.5  18.9  40.9  50.8  54.9  55.2  60.2 




33.6 35.5 34.2  36.6  34.6  37.1 




40.6 40.8 41.8  41.7  42.7  42.5 




-7.0  -5.3  -7.6 -5.1 -8.1 -5.4 
Net capital stock at  
end of period 8   4/ 
 Rate of capital formation 
(I/S) in period: 
 Percent of bank assets in default at end 
of period 
 
   4 6  8  4  6  8   
Sector 1     100.0  15.8  12.8  10.9  Bank1  0.5  0.6  3.3   
Sector 2  100.0  0.3  0.4  0.4  Bank2 4.9 6.5  14.4   
Sector  3  100.0  11.2  9.5 8.5 Bank3 0.7 1.0  5.0   
Sector 4  100.0  29.0  20.5  15.6  Bank4  0.9  1.2  6.1   




1/  These are index numbers based on period 1. 
2/  As a percentage of GDP. 
3/ The Tanzanian interest rates are not market determined, so there is little point in making 
historical comparisons. 
4/  The capital stocks are normalized to their net period 2 values in this simulations 
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Table 2. Spending on Infrastructure Financed by Foreign Capital */ 
 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 
Nominal GDP  1/  99.9  111.4  128.1  146.2  172.9 201.9 248.8 293.9 
Real GDP 1/  102.4  102.4  108.4  107.7  112.9  112.4  119.8  117.7 
Price level 1/  97.6  108.8  118.2  135.5  151.4  179.6  207.7  249.7 
Government revenues 
2/ 
14.1  14.2  14.6  14.6  14.8 14.5 14.9 14.8 
Government 
expenditure 2/ 
24.2  25.0  27.7  30.4  31.1 34.9 33.5 37.7 
Budget deficit 2/  10.1  10.2  13.1  15.8  16.3  20.4  18.6  22.9 
Exchange rate ($/T)  91.3  110.2  124.2  152.0  173.0  217.3  255.5  326.7 
Interest rate   7.4  15.1  17.8  37.8  48.4  52.2  53.2  58.7 
Exports  2/  29.0  31.2  30.6  32.5  31.3 33.2 31.7 33.8 
Imports  2/  38.1  38.4  40.2  40.3  41.2 41.2 42.2 42.0 
Trade balance 2/  -9.1  -7.2  -9.6 -7.8  -9.9  -8.0  -10.5  -8.2 
Net capital stock at  
end of period 8   3/ 
 Rate of capital formation 
(I/S) in period: 
 Percent of bank assets in default at end 
of period 
   4  6  8    4  6  8   
Sector 1  1007  16.0  12.8  10.9  Bank1  0.5       0.6  3.2   
Sector 2  100.0  0.3  0.3  0.4  Bank2  4.8  6.6  14.3   
Sector 3  98.6  10.5  9.0  8.0  Bank3  0.7  1.0  5.1   
Sector 4  99.5  28.9  20.0  15.6  Bank4  0.9  1.2  6.0   
Sector 5  99.2  6.1  5.8  5.3  Bank5  1.0  1.4  23.5   
*/    We assume that public expenditure on infrastructure (capital) increases by 3 percentage 
points of GDP. Of this increase, two thirds is financed by increased foreign grants to the Central 
Government. The remainder continues to be financed from domestic resources. 
 
 
1/  These are index numbers based on period 1.\ 
2/  As a percentage of GDP. 
3/  The capital stocks are based upon the end of final period stocks in Table 1. 
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Table 3. Improved Efficiency of Public Utilities */ 
 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 
Nominal GDP  1/  100.0 111.1 127.4 145.4  172.9  202.5  252.0  299.4 
Real GDP 1/  102.4  102.4  107.2  106.4  112.9  11.1  121.3  119.2 
Price level 1/  99.3  108.8  118.8  136.6  153.2  182.3  207.7  251.1 
Government revenues 
2/ 
14.1  14.2  14.7  14.6  14.9 14.8 15.0 14.9 
Government 
expenditure 2/ 
24.2  25.0  26.2  28.8  29.7 33.3 32.1 36.1 
Budget deficit 2/  10.1  10.2  11.5  14.2  14.8  18.5  17.1  21.2 
Exchange rate ($/T)  91.3  110.2  135.3  165.4  189.9  239.3  285.4  365.8 
Interest rate   7.4  15.1  18.3  39.8  50.0  54.7  55.6  60.7 
Exports  2/  29.0  31.2  33.6  35.6  34.4 36.5 35.0 37.2 
Imports  2/  38.1  38.4  40.7  40.8  41.9 41.9 42.8 42.7 
Trade balance 2/  -9.1  -7.2  -7.1  -5.2  -7.5 -5.4 -7.8 -5.5 
Net capital stock at  
end of period 8   3/ 
 Rate of capital formation 
(I/S) in period: 
 Percent of bank assets in default at end 
of period 
   4  6  8    4  6  8   
Sector 1  100.2  16.0  12.7  10.9  Bank1  0.5       0.6  0.7   
Sector 2  100.0  0.3  0.4  0.4  Bank2  5.0  6.8  7.8   
Sector 3  98.3  10.7  9.1  8.1  Bank3  0.8  1.0  1.2   
Sector 4  100.5  29.8  20.1  15.6  Bank4  0.9  1.2  1.4   
Sector 5  100.5  6.4  5.9  5.7  Bank5  1.1  1.4  1.7   
 
*/     We assume that public utilities, namely, sector 13, electricity and water, and sector 20, 
communications, require 20 percent less real value added per unit of output than before. This 
reduction thus reflects an improvement in the efficiency of these utilities. 
 
 
1/  These are index numbers based on period 1. 
2/  As a percentage of GDP. 
3/  The capital stocks are based upon the end of final period stocks in Table 1. 
 
 
 